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hat  the  negotiations  on  the  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  (MFF)  for  2014-2020 
ended on November 23rd without securing an agreement should not have come as a 
surprise to  anyone.  Still,  there  was  something different  in  the  air  this  time  round, 
marked by the relatively amicable way in which the disagreement was handled, in contrast 
to the acrimony and angst of the failed negotiations seven years ago under the Luxembourg 
Presidency.  At  this  stage,  it  is  likely  that  no  Head  of  State  held  any  illusions  that  an 
agreement would be reached. Such good-natured discussions, however, may turn ugly in 
subsequent meetings when the pressure to reach agreement mounts. In 2005, the then UK 
Prime Minister Tony Blair warned that the EU should never again enter into such destructive 
negotiations, but the risk of repeating that painful experience – or an even a worse one – is 
high.   
Something missing in the Commission proposal… 
It is convenient to blame the crisis for the breakdown in talks, but one must look further to 
explain  the  situation  today.  In  2005,  Europe  was  basking  in  economic  growth,  but  the 
criticisms levelled against the budget proposals were very similar. The issues raised then 
have not been adequately addressed. Are thus the Commission proposals so bad? Well, they 
are certainly not good enough, and we can trace the origins of their shortcomings to the 
budget review itself. It offered the perfect opportunity to analyse individual sub-budget lines 
and cut underperforming and obsolete lines with a view to streamlining operations. The 
opportunity was not seized, however, and the analyses and discussions remained at a very 
superficial and lofty ‘Eurospeak’ level. The largely undefined ‘value added’ of expenditure 
was used equally to criticise and defend the different EU policies.  
This exercise brought us little new on budget reform, because large policies cannot be judged 
as a package – only the individual components can be. In the absence of a proper analysis of 
the  benefits  of  individual  actions  financed  through  EU  policies,  the  review  lacked  the 
groundwork and thus any solid grounds on which to propose a significant restructuring of 
the  budget.  As  a  consequence,  rather  than  eliminating  questionable  interventions,  the 
Commission just added a long list of actions related to its increasing competences in the 
areas of energy, transport, research, etc. In short, it created a bureaucratic compromise that 
made  space  for  important  new  priorities,  but  at  the  same  time  protected  the  traditional 
agricultural and structural funds.  
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The proposals also reflected current thinking within the Commission, selectively borrowing 
sentences from the budget review to pretend that the views of civil society had been taken 
into account. Among certain constituencies, in fact, the review process may have damaged 
the image  of  the  Commission,  as  many  felt  that  their  opinions  had  not  received  serious 
consideration. 
Tony Blair’s speech of 2005 deserves a second reading today (good political speeches on the 
EU budget are rare). It was powerful and contained unquestionable truths. In summary, he 
said that the EU budget is out of touch with reality, disconnected from the needs of the 
European Union as an economic and political union facing an increasingly complex world. 
The difficulties the EU has had in coming to grips with the economic crisis and the evident 
uselessness of the budget as a tool to deal with these challenges should have sent a strong 
message to the European institutions and the member states on what has to be done.1  
Unfortunately, the member states have placed a different construction on the crisis and its 
implications for the EU budget. For some, it simply confirmed their belief that the budget is a 
wasteful instrument. For others it is seen as a financial pot to cushion the crisis. Sadly, the 
idea that we need to fundamentally restructure the logic of the budget to make it a powerful 
long-term investment tool is not widely appreciated.  
Negotiating boxes and Herman Van Rompuy’s surprise entrance 
As the budget process proceeded, it slowly became clear that there was little chance that the 
Commission proposal would be found acceptable. Worryingly, the first Council compromise 
‘negotiating box’ prepared by the Cypriot Presidency was far from satisfactory. Its proposals 
took  a  step  backwards  from  the  Commission  proposal,  reducing  lines  with  a  long-term 
investment objective, such as the Connecting Europe Facility, while protecting traditional 
expenditures. The proposals did not even touch the size of rural development funds. 
But  then,  in  a  welcome  and  surprise  development,  Herman  Van  Rompuy,  an  additional 
‘technocratic’ Council President, entered the fray. Realising that the Cypriot proposal was 
highly unlikely to succeed, and that it threatened to inflict damage on the most valuable 
areas of the budget, namely RDI and the Connecting Europe Facility, he magically launched 
a new proposal containing further cuts and an astonishing level of detail (suggesting that the 
work must have been started well before it was announced).2 Van Rompuy’s first negotiating 
box had many merits, not least for being the first to seek to cut expenditure where it makes 
sense, for example in the Common Agricultural Policy and the Cohesion Funds. It has served 
as  a  far  more  useful  negotiating  base  than  the  Commission’s  proposal  or  the  Cypriot 
compromise, and has probably contributed to the relative calm of the discussions. 
Where should we go from here?  
Van Rompuy’s strategy to protect core budget lines has been weakened by the insistence of 
some  countries  to  protect  the  CAP  and  limit  cuts  to  structural  funds,  including  cuts  to 
wealthier regions. France, as usual, insists on protecting the interests of the farm lobbies, and 
preserving a policy that suffers from a large deadweight loss. It is not that an agricultural 
                                                    
1 See, for example, J. Núñez Ferrer and D. Tarschys (2012), Investing where it matters: An EU budget for 
long term growth, CEPS Task Force Report, CEPS, Brussels. 
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policy is not useful, but the present allocation of funding is far from optimal and regressive. 
Large, well-targeted reductions could be managed without significantly affecting the sector. 
France is worried that the cuts are occurring simultaneously with an increase in payments to 
new member states, which means that cuts would affect it proportionally more. Perhaps it is 
high time to resuscitate the concept of co-financing, particularly for wealthier member states.  
More cuts are needed, but where? Apart from agriculture, there are a number of actions 
across the budget where the value-added is highly questionable. Approximately €50 billion 
are  destined  to  go  to  richer  regions  in  Europe,  some  of  which  may  be  directed  into 
investments  of  European  importance,  but  much  can  be  reduced.  It  is  telling  is  that  the 
proposed cuts of these funds by Van Rompuy have now been reduced. If net contributors are 
so strongly committed to cutting the budget, then why not start with those? 
Perhaps the time has also come to streamline the EU’s operations. Granted, the Union is 
facing complex and difficult challenges, but its resources are spread across every imaginable 
domain.  Furthermore,  to  please  member  states,  over  30  agencies  have  been  created  and 
scattered across Europe, some of which are useful and important, such as the food safety 
agency  or  Eurocontrol,  but  others  are  much  less  so.  For  example,  gender  equality  is 
undeniably an important goal and one worthy of promotion and regulation at the EU level, 
but can one justify the costs of devoting an entire agency to it? Or the agency for vocational 
training? Vocational training is to be designed by local authorities and based on national and 
regional needs. Is there a real need for a separate agency? The same questions are valid for 
other areas such as culture.  
There is a need to bring refocus the attention of the EU institutions and policies on the core 
areas  of  the  internal market, trade and  energy, using some  of  the  savings to  expand  the 
headings where common action creates savings at European level (something useful in times 
of crisis) and where joint action brings the highest long-term benefits for Europe. This is 
where a serious budget review would have been truly instrumental. 
If there is a will, there is certainly a way to cut and to make the budget better and more 
effective, but all countries need to make concessions, with the largest costs falling on the 
wealthier member states. We also need to seize the opportunity created by the fact that net 
contributors  are  focusing  strongly  on  the  overall  size  of  the  budget  and  not,  for  once, 
constantly repeating the word net balance. 
Is there going to be an agreement? 
It is likely that there is eventually going to be an agreement on the budget, but one that is far 
from satisfactory and probably with a bottom line slightly lower than the one rejected by the 
Council last week. 
But  what  happens  if  there  is  no  agreement  or  if  the  European  Parliament  vetoes  the 
agreement? The figures for last year of this MFF (2013) would apply provisionally in 2014 for 
as long as there is no new agreement (plus an inflation adjustment of 2%). This would of 
course wreak havoc with regional policy planning, etc., but it is all the rest that would be 
rather  ironical:  all  rebates,  VAT  concessions,  etc.  for  net  contributors  would  no  longer 
apply… except for the UK rebate, which remains as a permanent feature. Not only would the 
rebate apply in full, but the ceilings and limitations imposed for this period would also end, 
giving the UK an even larger rebate. Is this a good reason for Cameron to cause the budget 
negotiations to fail? Unlikely, because perpetuating the budget dispute is not even worth the 
extra rebate and may completely alienate the UK from the rest of the EU, in particular if an 
agreement is reached to cut the MFF substantially. And will the EP veto the result? This 4 | JORGE NÚÑEZ FERRER 
 
move  is  also  highly  unlikely,  because  the  agreement  would  reflect  a  very  difficult 
compromise,  and  the  European  Parliament  would  not  reap  any  benefit  from  reopening 
Pandora’s box. 
When is this going to end? 
The good news is thus that there is most likely going to be a budget agreement before the 
summer, and possibly even earlier.  
The bad news is that the EU budget will probably remain largely disconnected from the 
fundamental needs of the European Union. The instrument will continue to please particular 
lobbies and interest groups, whose contribution to Europe’s future wealth and sustainability 
can be seriously questioned. But it will not be able to respond to crises and will be useless as 
an instrument to address imbalances in the eurozone. It will continue to be financed through 
absurd,  opaque  and  largely  incomprehensible  contribution  mechanisms,  as  there  is  little 
chance to introduce more meaningful resources. And last but not least, it will continue to 
inspire  more  headlines  about  waste  and  corruption,  further  alienating  citizens  of  many 
countries from the European ideal; in other words, ‘business as usual’.  
This grim prospect also explains the sudden idea to create a eurozone budget, a kind of EU 
budget that matters … as opposed to ‘the budget that matters little’? Maybe it is high time to 
exchange the one we have with such a budget, but unfortunately, there are no takers among 
our leaders, whose ears are mostly attuned to the voice of organised lobbyists and interest 
groups. An EU budget that would benefit all of us in the long-term does not cultivate strong 
and politically meaningful support groups.  
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Annex 
The budgets compared: Commission and Van Rompuy’s I and II negotiation boxes (€ million) 
  2007-2013*  Commission 
Proposal 
HVR nego-box  
13 Nov. 
HVR nego-box  
22 Nov. 
Competitiveness  91,495  164,316  152,652  139,542 
 Of  which:  Connecting 
Europe Facility  12,783  40,249  36,249  31,249 
Cohesion Policy  354,815  338,994  309,495  320,148 
Of which: for poorer regions**  195,744  162,600  156,236  161,427 
Of  which:  for  transition 
regions**  25,290  39,000  29,187  31,393 
Of which: for richer regions**  53,867  53,100  47,505  50,872 
Of which: Cohesion Funds**  67,921  68,700  65,928  66,341 
Natural Resources  420,682  389,972  364,472  372,229 
Of which: CAP Direct Payments 
and market related expenditure  304,830  286,551  269,852  277,852 
Of which: Rural Development  95,741  91,966  83,666  83,666 
Security and Citizenship  12,366  18,809  18,309  16,685 
Global Europe  56,815  70,000  63,690  60,667 
Administration  57,082  63,165  62,629  62,629 
Compensations  0,920  0,027  0,027  0,027 
TOTAL  994,176  1045,282  971,274  971,928 
Other, outside MFF  40,838  46,268  37,582  36,883 
TOTAL II  1,035,013  1,091,551  1,008,856  1,008,810 
*Adjusted to 2011 prices. 
 ** Author’s adjusted figures for 2007-2013, represent similar categories. Table does not include all 
subcategories. 
Sources:  European  Commission;  www.europolitics.info,  www.u4unity.eu  (VR_NG_Analysis);  and 
www.euractive.com 
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Note: Does not include figures outside the MFF. 
Source: Author’s own rendering. 
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